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Grodin Joseph
CONTRACT, TORT, AND INDIVIDUAL
RESPONSIBILITY: AN ANALYTIC
FRAMEWORK
Joseph R. Grodin t
Professor Olson provided us with an amusing and fast moving
dialogue. I would like to present an analytic framework focusing
upon contract and its relation to tort within the theme of this con-
ference on individual responsibility. To begin, I invite you to accept
a series of propositions.
First, governments and private power centers oppress people.
That is, employers, labor unions, and insurance companies may op-
press. Second, such oppression is a legitimate subject of govern-
ment concern and action. When private power centers oppress
people, it is appropriate for government to intervene through law
and address that oppression. Third, contract, while historically the
handmaiden of liberty, can also be a tool of oppression. Sir Henry
Maine talked about how the progress of the law evolved from status
to contract but we know that contract can also be a form of status.'
I used to represent labor unions. Labor unions have bylaws
and, as their lawyer, I argued that a union's bylaws should be viewed
as a contract among the members of the union or between the union
and each member individually. Thus, when a person became a
member of a union, he subscribed to a contract and was bound by it.
If the contract authorized expulsion from union membership for any
reason or by any process, the member agreed to such a provision
and should have been held to it.
The courts, quite properly, rejected that proposition 2 and ruled
that union bylaws are contracts in name only. They are contracts of
adhesion. Such contracts exist when a party with superior bargain-
ing strength imposes a contract upon an individual under circum-
t B.A., U.C. Berkeley; J.D., Yale University; Ph.D. Labor Law/Labor Relations,
London School of Economics. From 1955 to 1972, Justice Grodin worked with a San
Francisco firm specializing in labor law. The author taught at the U.C. Hastings College
of Law from 1972 to 1979. In 1979 he became an Associate Justice on the California
Court of Appeals, in 1982 a PresidingJustice of the Court of Appeals, and from 1982 to
1987 was an Associate Justice on the California Supreme Court. He returned to
academia in 1987, first teaching at U.C. Berkeley and U.C.L.A., then returning to U.C.
Hastings where he is still on the faculty.
I HENRY S. MAINE, ANCIENT LAw 170 (14th ed. 1891).
2 See JOSEPH R. GRODIN, UNION GOVERNMENT AND THE LAW 54, 64-69 (1960).
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stances where no market really exists-they are a form of status
imposed in the guise of contract. Both courts and legislatures im-
posed limitations upon the union-member relationship that were
not limited by the terms of any agreement.
In the employment relationship, similar limitations on contract
exist. We cannot contract to sell ourselves into slavery. We cannot
give up freedom in return for any amount of money such that a
court will enforce the bargain. Legislatively imposed wage and hour
laws exist. We also have worker's compensation, which overrides
the terms of any contrary agreement. Professor Olson talked about
the man at the baseball game.3 Do we want to live in a society in
which a worker, as a condition of obtaining employment, may be
required to relinquish any claim to employer liability through
worker's compensation or negligence? Title VII, with its limitations
upon contract, promotes nondiscrimination principles.4 The Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act tells us that, as a matter of public
policy, questions of safety will not be left entirely to the market-
place.5 The recent polygraph testing law tells us that a contract can-
not determine when an employer may insist upon giving employees
a polygraph test or when that employer may rely upon such tests as
a basis for dismissal. These are all intrusions upon contract. The
aforementioned intrusions are the result of legislative action rather
than judicial creations. If what we are talking about is contract ver-
sus individual responsibility, however, the source of the incursion is
irrelevant.
It is important to recognize that we are not talking about the
Madisonian dilemma here. We are not talking about constitutional
principles and the autonomy of an unelected judiciary imposing its
will upon the democratically elected branches. We are talking about
common law. We are talking about a set of legal principles that
judges created. Judges may have created those legal principles with
attention to standards that permeated the institutions of particular
societies. They were created, nevertheless, by human beings and
they were not a brooding omnipresence in the sky.
The common law, by definition, is subject to change. A contin-
uing dialogue exists between the courts and the legislature. For ex-
ample, in the field of labor union regulations, the exceptions to
contract principles that courts developed in the adjudicative process
came to be adopted by federal and state legislatures. Similarly, in
California, the legislature adopted and codified the principles devel-
3 See Walter Olson, Tortification of Contract Law: Displacing Consent and Agreement, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 1043 (1992).
4 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1988).
5 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1988).
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oped by courts. When the legislature did not agree with those prin-
ciples, it changed them. Thus, there is nothing peculiar about
judge-made law with respect to the tension between contract and
tort.
The question, then, is not whether we will have some abstract
and sacrosanct notion of freedom of contract. The question is,
under what circumstances is the law justified in limiting the use of
contract by one party to impose conditions upon another that soci-
ety may regard as oppressive. I suppose the answer is that the justi-
fication exists under those circumstances in which we think the
market does not operate very well, either because we have some the-
oretical basis for believing that in particular contexts the market
does not operate as the economists tell us it ought to operate-as, I
suggest, in the employment context or in the insurance context-or
because, as a pragmatic matter, we look at the results and we find
them to be unacceptable. Look at the issue of safety in the work
place. We are not prepared to tell a worker who is subjected to un-
safe conditions, "If you do not like it, go get a job elsewhere."
Finally, I have a comment on the question of remedies. I think
it is important to distinguish between the question, "Under what
circumstances should the law impose unwaivable contractual condi-
tions?" and the question, "What kinds of remedies should be in-
voked for what kinds of obligations?" Again, these questions can be
posed to legislatures and to courts. A legislature can readily include
additional compensatory remedies and perhaps punitive damages
for victims of discrimination. Unfortunately, the common law prin-
ciples relating to remedies have rigidly developed. Thus, courts
have available to them either contract principles or tort principles of
recovery, both of which are rather rigid. Contract principles often
yield inadequate recoveries for certain kinds of injuries (for exam-
ple, when an insurance company not only fails to pay benefits pro-
vided for in the policy but engages in deceptive practices in the
hope that policyholders will abandon their claims). Hiring a lawyer
in such a case may not be worthwhile if all that can be recovered
ultimately is the amount that was originally owed. In such circum-
stances, the tort remedy is an alternative that courts have available
to them. There are problems with tort remedies, however, espe-
cially with respect to unlimited punitive damages. Perhaps the ideal
solution does not lie either in the realms of contract or tort doctrine
but in more creative remedies that the legislature might develop.
That is hardly an argument, however, for holding their hands be-
hind their collective backs and doing nothing.
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